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Who’s in charge, in whose interest? The experience of ownership and 
accountability in the charity sector 
Abstract: In the UK as in other countries, charities are companies, bound by company law as 
well as regulatory constraints of the non-profit sector. Many are tiny, micro-businesses, but 
others are sizeable enterprises and several hundred employees and thousands of beneficiaries. 
All but a few are led by voluntary boards of directors/trustees, and in many of those the trustees 
are also the “members” of the company, that is, the legal owners of the business, as 
shareholders are in conventional companies. This paper explores the literature of charity 
boards and governance and reflects on recent personal experience of boards to develop a 
research agenda to expand our understanding of the puzzles associated with the question 
“Who’s in charge?”, as well as to elaborate a typology of interests the governance of the sector 
serves. 
Keywords: Charity boards, non-profit organisations, directors, trustees, boards, corporate 
governance 
Introduction 
For the past several years, charities in the UK have laboured under a cloud and in a 
spotlight. The spotlight came in early 2018, when one of the largest charities in the country, 
Oxfam, faced allegations of sexual abuse by senior members of its relief teams working in 
fragile environments, including Haiti. They were exploiting people they had been sent to help.  
The cloud was closer to home. The social care sector was shocked by several cases in 
2011-13 of abuse in homes and hospitals for elderly people or others with learning disabilities 
and mental health problems. The operators involved were not charities, but the sector includes 
many charitable organisations, including some quite large ones.  
These cases galvanised concern about the nature of governance in charities. At Oxfam, 
the allegations stemmed from work in 2011. Oxfam had investigated them but said nothing 
and did seemingly little. What did senior management know, and when did they know it. 
Where was the board? In the case sector, what had the regulators been doing? Why did it take 
a television documentary to highlight the problem? Could residents and families of other care 
homes, including those in the charitable sector, count on the boards of those organisations to 
do a better job?   
This paper is a personal reflection on such questions concerning my appointment to charity 
boards, starting in early 2018. It begins with a seemingly trivial incident, but one that begs the 
question of who’s in charge, in the end, in these odd legal entities called charities. As you will 
already have gathered, this paper takes a less-than-conventional approach to academic writing. 
I feel impelled to do so by the very personal, even visceral feelings that prompted its creation. 
I find a licence to make such an attempt1 in recent calls from business and management 
scholars and editors of important journal to rediscover the form of the essay and exploit its 
purpose (Barley, 2016; Suddaby, 2019; Vince & Hibbert, 2018). 
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On my first day as chair of the trustees of a moderately large charity – also my first day 
as a trustee of any charity – I was confronted with an issue – a straightforward one – I hadn’t 
anticipated. Several former trustees were legally still regarded as “members” of the company. 
Under the articles of association, we would need to provide them an annual report and invite 
them to an annual meeting. Under the proposed articles, we could do away with annual 
meetings, provided that the company members and the trustees were identical. Few charities 
seemed to have as members anyone other than the trustees, I was assured. If the board agreed 
to ask the non-trustee members to stand down, it would be my duty to write to them to explain 
the reason and seek their agreement. Or should we simply dismiss them? What would I like to 
do? 
As a corporate governance scholar, I was fully aware of the idea of “members”. It is a 
peculiarity of British law, dating back to the centuries before incorporation with limited 
liability and referring to the role played by shareholders, the top of the pyramid accountability. 
Boards of directors – or of trustees2 – are the next tier. They are legally responsible and 
personally liable for the affairs of the company. Unlike members, they do not enjoy limited 
liability; the courts afford them considerable discretion, akin to the “business judgement” rule 
in the US State of Delaware, much copied in other jurisdictions.  
But when you become director of a company, especially as chair, and you know next to 
nothing about the business, and there are a thousand people whose livelihoods depend on the 
business and almost as many vulnerable people depending on the services the other thousand 
deliver, you can be forgiven for having an odd sensation. After all, you receive no gain, have 
nothing at stake in the business, and no direct engagement in the services that the charity 
provided. Were you really supposed to know what it feels like to be accountable only to the 
other member-directors who are looking to you for guidance?  
That first day-in-the-boardroom set out the puzzle of this paper: Who is really – in practice, 
not just in law – in charge of charities? Who holds directors accountable for their decisions, 
for the use of money from the public – from the state or from public donations? Who sues the 
directors when things go wrong, in the way that shareholders of public companies can take 
them and the company to court? The question of “in whose interest” is articulated in regulation 
– the beneficiaries’, not the donors or directors – but that only blurs the distinction between 
how it works in practice. What happens when beneficiaries are to a large extent people unable 
to exercise judgement over their affairs, when the directors are de facto and perhaps even de 
jure their guardians? Directors may dismiss the managers for poor performance, and even step 
in, temporarily, to manage its affairs in times of crisis. But does this confluence of roles of 
member-director-guardian change the nature of the director-manager interface? These were 
questions – with legal, moral, psychological, sociological and perhaps even economic facets 
– I hadn’t anticipated. I had an uncomfortable feeling in my stomach, as well as cognitive 
dissonance, even though I knew the literature of corporate governance rather well.  
This essay explores that gut reaction and mental noise, by looking at what the literature of 
charity governance has already examined, and what law and regulation do and how that might 
account for the differences between normal companies and this strange variant.  
I seek to articulate, though not to resolve, the puzzle of who “owns” a charity, not merely 
legally, but also in the psychological sense. The paper concludes with observations of a 
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practical sense, thinking out loud about what director/trustees can do, even in absence of hard 
evidence or even reasonable theory.3  
To do so it draws upon two common types of charitable enterprises: Let’s call them “care” 
and “arts” (see Table 1). As it happens, I serve on two charity boards, one of each type. This 
classification does not arise from a well-researched typology of charities. There are many 
others, but these are large and encapsulate the issues of others. Both address instances of 
market failure; one however stems from sensations of personal anguish, while the other is fun.  
 
Table 1 - 'Care' and 'arts': similarities and differences 
 “Care” archetype “Arts” archetype 
Form Company limited by guarantee Company limited by guarantee 
Members Typically, trustees Typically, trustees 
Trustees Typically, people with some 
connection to the care 
Typically, people with interest in 
the art form 
Beneficiaries Service users, those who need 
care 
Two types: artists and audiences, 
who serve each other 
Sources of funding Local government, health service Local government, national 
agencies, corporate and personal 
donors 
Purpose Address market failure arising 
from disability of beneficiary to 
engage in market 
Address market failure arising 
from imbalances in cost of 
production and price 
requirements 
Commercial/charitable 
split in activities 
Overwhelmingly charitable Mix, often dominantly 
commercial 
 
Using these two as archetypes lets us explore what it means – legally, cognitively, 
emotionally, to be in charge of a charity, and what that means for the nature of accountability, 
within the organisation and with respect to the larger society. Let’s first compare charities with 
more conventional companies to understand the layers of governance that apply and how they 
differ. Here I draw parallels not only to commercial companies but also to social enterprises. 
We turn then to charity boards, how they compare with more conventional companies. This 
discussion is situated in UK, and more specifically in English law. Aspects of it will differ in 
other jurisdictions, but probably more in the detail than in the principle-level lessons I seek to 
draw. After a brief overview of two main and contradictory perspectives on governance, we’ll 
consider the (or, more precisely, my) experience of being in the strange limbo of being on the 
board of a charity. The paper then concludes with reflections of what we don’t know about 
charities and how we might understand to find out more. 
Governance layers 
“Governance” is a slippery term. The Cadbury Code (1992), which articulated corporate 
governance in the UK and became a model for codes around the world, defines corporate 
governance as “the system by which companies are directed and controlled”. Gourevitch and 
Shinn (2005, p. 3) call it “the authority structure of a firm”, while Perrow (2002, p. 198) sees 
governance as defining “property relations”.  
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While much charity-governance research has focused narrowly on boards, the situation 
within charities, as Cornforth (2012) explains, is more complex than the literature suggests. 
As with listed companies (see Nordberg, 2011), charity governance comes in multiple layers, 
and these two types differ in important ways. Both work in markets, and the structure and 
dynamics of those markets shape the freedom of action of the organisations. Arguably, the 
purpose of the charity sector is to provide services in cases of market failure (Payton & Moody, 
2008); to neo-liberal economists, however, market failure is also the main justification of the 
state, so are charities the solution to state failure? Should we even be asking such questions 
(cf. Booth, 2008), given the weaknesses of the concept of market failure, when more complex 
issues exist? The terms “market failure” and “property relations” that governance 
arrangements concern are abstractions that take us a long way from the task – providing 
support for people in one form of need or another, which seem not to be met in other ways, 
and which have benefits for society at large.  
Such organisations compete for government grants or service-delivery contracts, with 
incentives to innovate for greater value capture through efficiency or new product/service 
development. But markets, especially in non-standard services, are less than perfect, and, as 
discussed above, the charitable sector exists in part to overcome examples of market failure. 
So, it’s not surprising that governance through market forces is less than perfect, too.  
Organisations typically interact with four types of markets: supplies, labour, capital and 
goods/services. Most are similar in character across public-, private- and third-sectors, with 
the notable exception that charities – to address market failure in goods and services and 
inelasticity in supplies – often depend on non-market access to capital (e.g. grants and 
donations) and non- or sub-market access to labour (e.g. volunteers, potential-earning 
sacrifices), while escaping tax on any surpluses generated.  
Other layers include law and regulation. On the statutory side, both charitable and ordinary 
companies must all comply with the Companies Act and other civil and criminal laws. 
Company law articulates the rules of company formation, conduct and dissolution, and 
importantly for our purposes the duty of directors. This works at a high-level, a blunt 
instrument of governance, open to much interpretation. 
Regulation then takes over, to put limits on the interpretation. Many sectors – perhaps all 
– are regulated, with the strength of oversight broadly proportional to the prospect of social 
harm and power imbalances between seller and buyer. Utilities are fundamental and attract 
much regulation; so too banking, and pubic hazards like waste management. Health and social 
care attract high levels of regulatory oversight on the grounds that beneficiaries are vulnerable 
owing to their potential incapacity as well as information asymmetries.  
Such services might be undertaken by other forms of organisations. Private, for-profit 
service providers take a lot of outsourced government business, but they avoid sectors where 
the extent of market failure is especially pronounced. Social enterprises – for-profit but not 
profit-focused companies – are another possibility. Like B-corporations in the United States, 
Britain’s community interest company (CICs) are often called hybrids (Battilana & Dorado, 
2010; Battilana, Sengul, Anne-Claire, & Model, 2015; Ebrahim, Battilana, & Mair, 2014). 
Such firms operate under a logic or ethos, articulated in their founding documents that call for 
owners to be willing to sacrifice financial value maximisation for the sake of community 
betterment. (For a summary of governance layers, see Table 2.) 
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Table 2 - Governance layers in organization types and their power 
Governance layer  Charity (care) Charity (arts) 
Community 
interest companies 
(CIC) Corporation 
Market for goods, 
services  
Local 
commissioners  
 
Powerful 
Customers; 
patrons, donors; 
national 
commissioners  
 
Powerful 
Customers  
 
Weak 
Customers 
 
Sector-dependent 
Market for labour Professionals; 
minimum wage  
 
Powerful, 
mitigated by 
intrinsic motivation 
Volunteer; 
minimum wage; 
professional  
 
Moderate, 
mitigated by 
intrinsic motivation 
Followers; 
minimum wage  
 
Moderate 
Professionals; 
skilled labour; 
minimum wage 
 
Powerful 
Market for capital Seed capital, often 
from government  
 
Powerful 
Seed capital, often 
from government 
 
Powerful 
Social investors 
 
Powerful 
Traditional debt, 
equity markets  
 
Moderate 
Market for supplies Commercial, with 
tolerance 
 
Moderate 
Commercial, with 
tolerance  
 
Moderate 
Commercial  
 
Powerful 
Commercial  
 
Sector-dependent 
Market for 
donations, legacies 
Believers  
 
Powerful, 
mitigated by 
intrinsic motivation 
Believers; 
philanthropists  
 
Powerful 
Believers; 
philanthropists  
 
Powerful 
Not applicable 
Law – most  Company law; 
charity; exemption 
from some taxes  
 
Moderate 
Company law; 
charity; 
exemptions from 
some taxes  
 
Moderate 
Company law; CIC  
 
Moderate 
Company law; 
international and 
national  
 
Moderate to weak;  
jurisdiction 
arbitrage? 
Regulation (for 
whose benefit) 
Central 
government agency 
(for beneficiaries) 
 
Powerful 
Central 
government agency 
(for donors, 
beneficiaries) 
 
Moderate 
Industry; local 
government agency 
(for market 
counter-parties) 
 
Weak 
Industry; national 
and multi-lateral 
(for market 
counter-parties) 
 
Sector-dependent 
“Owners” Puzzling Puzzling Owner-managers; 
benefactors  
 
Powerful 
Shareholders 
 
Structure-
dependent 
Boards Volunteer (in the 
main), working and 
trophy 
 
Powerful 
Volunteer (in the 
main), trophy and 
working 
 
Firm-dependent 
Owner-managers; 
advisers, paid 
 
Moderate 
Executive and non-
exec, paid 
 
Firm-dependent 
Governance code Charity sector 
 
Weak 
Charity sector 
 
Weak 
Small firm 
 
Weak to non-
existent 
Codes for listed, 
unlisted firms 
 
Weak (private) to 
moderate (listed) 
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Cases where market failure is most acute and property relations are least clear offer little 
if any incentive to for-profit private firms or CIOs. Here is where charities operate. They seem 
to come in at least two main varieties, with differing regulatory oversight: Charities serving 
the most vulnerable (i.e. “care”) are generally more tightly monitored than those serving the 
able who need aid to engage in the market (i.e. “arts”). 
Charity boards  
Regulation is insufficiently granular to monitor and control the work of organisations in 
any sector. That’s the role of boards of directors. Charities empanel directors for many of the 
same reasons that corporations do. They want advice from outsiders, whose experience may 
involve different sectors and a variety of skills, and they need – often in law – a mechanism 
of accountability. And yet governance of non-profit and voluntary organisations is often 
viewed as problematic (Cornforth, 2001). 
There are a variety of forms of charities in the UK, “associations”, “trusts”, “charitable 
companies”, “charitable incorporated organisations”, “corporations created by Parliament”, 
“Royal chartered bodies”, and “community benefit societies”.4 Trusts and associations tend to 
be smaller entities, and they are not considered legal personalities; most substantial entities 
use the “company” form, though more recent ones take advantage of the less complex legal 
form of the CIO. For simplicity, we’ll focus our discussion on “companies”.  
Charities are just like other companies, until they aren’t. In UK law,5 they are often 
organised as companies “limited by guarantee”. That means there is no paid-in share capital 
as such. Directors merely guarantee to contribute one pound (ca. $1.30) should the company 
need it. Directors are generally protected from personal liability, though not in the case of 
fraudulent trading. 
In law, directors of charitable companies aren’t allowed to benefit directly from the charity 
itself. Traditionally, that has meant that these positions were held by volunteers, unpaid 
individuals charged with overseeing the work of those paid to undertake the charitable 
activities. While changes in law now permit charitable companies to enact governing 
documents that permit payment, the practice is still rare. As a result, directors are unlikely to 
be motivated directly by their (non)remuneration.   
Moreover, charity boards differ from those in British listed companies in an important 
way. Listed companies – and companies in general – have unitary boards, where executives 
sit alongside non-executive directors. Such boards are associated with collaborative action, 
emphasising the “service” role of directors (Hillman, Nicholson, & Shropshire, 2008). They 
run the risk that non-executives will be “captured” and pay insufficient attention to their 
“control” responsibilities. Nonetheless they have been strongly defended by corporations and 
investors alike during the 1980s and 1990s, when European legislation sought to abolish them 
to enhance boards as a controlling mechanism of corporate governance (Montgomery, 1989; 
Nordberg, 2017; Spira & Slinn, 2013). 
Charity boards, by contrast, are made up entirely of outsiders. Executives are not permitted 
to sit on boards of the charities that employ them. This has similarities to the two-tier board 
structures common in continental Europe (Maassen & van den Bosch, 1999). Such structures 
are meant to enhance the “control” role of boards and protect against capture, though such 
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outside directors can be neutralised through executives’ manipulation of information flows 
(Bezemer, Peij, de Kruijs, & Maassen, 2014).  
Charities often attract the great-and-good to their boards of trustees, people who can open 
doors to donations or smooth the way to access to funding. Such directors serve their charities 
in much in the way that listed companies used to collect “trophy directors” (Dobrzynski, 1996; 
Fisch, 1997) and may still do to meet quotas for women (Branson, 2012; Orbach, 2017).  
But charity trustees in Britain are not just figureheads. They are legally directors of the 
companies established for charitable purpose. They attest to director duties described in the 
2006 Companies Act, which bind them to “promote the success of the company in the interests 
of its members as a whole” while having “due regard” for the interests of other stakeholders 
(UK Parliament, 2006, Section 172.1). The term “members”, through centuries of precedent, 
means the owners of the business, the shareholders in normal companies. The roles of director 
and member are therefore legally distinct. Directors have a duty to members; they have 
unlimited, personal liability. Members’ liability is limited (depending on the terms of 
incorporation), and limited rights. They receive reports from the directors, but they do not 
automatically have a voice on policy, except indirectly through their right to appoint directors. 
But members are, in law, the principals; directors are their agents. Members have the legal 
right to elect the directors; directors have a fiduciary duty to members.  
Agency and stewardship 
These distinctions point to another part of the charity board puzzle that links back to one 
of the main theoretical debates in corporate governance: Is executive and board behaviour 
better described by agency theory or the contradictory arena of stewardship?  
Agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) assumes economic 
actors will act in self-interested ways. Agents may not share the interests of principals, and 
through information asymmetries are able to divert corporate resources for personal gain. To 
align individual behaviour with organisational goals requires a two-pronged approach: 
incentives for managers that are congruent with the organisation’s aspirations, and hierarchical 
mechanisms to monitor them and control their actions.  
Stewardship theory, by contrast, sees individuals as acting, in the main, in line with the 
organisation, motivated by a collectivist, social approach and concerned with satisfying higher 
needs of self-esteem and personal fulfilment (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). Its 
conclusions are the opposite of agency theory. Let people get on with the job. Trust them, 
don’t monitor. This suggests that accountability is interpersonal, horizontal, and enacted as 
much through peers as supervisors. 
Agency theory predicts a self-interested struggle over control over resources, irrespective 
of property rights. Stewardship theory, by contrast, assumes a pro-social attitude, collaboration 
not contestation, and a sense of duty to others, not just respect for rights.  
This brings us back to the problem outlined at the start of this essay. In implementing our 
new articles, wasn’t I, as director, and we as a board, depriving members of their rights? Did 
this action take away their “property”, in some sense, even in members of a company have no 
rights to the assets of a business? Was our high-minded attempt to relieve absent members of 
any reputational risk really an example of high-handed disregard of members’ interests? Was 
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this perhaps more an example of an agency problem that boards were meant to counter, than 
an example of the stewardship directors should show to the members whose interests they are 
meant to defend? Or is this just a definitional storm in an intellectual teacup, a meaningless 
piece of mental gymnastics? Do charities have what we usually call “owners”?  
The experience 
For one of the charities I serve, let’s call it CareSW, life began following the 1990 National 
Health Service and Care in the Community Act. Starting in the 1980s with reforms by the 
Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher, such “care in the community” was a way 
of introducing market pressure in the place of governance by state bureaucracy (Andrews & 
Phillips, 2000). It was an element of what has been called the New Public Management (Ferlie, 
Ashburner, Fitzgerald, & Pettigrew, 1996; Hood, 1995), where the state withdraws from one 
of its agency conflicts – owning and regulating care by placing delivery in the hands of outside 
organisations (including charities) subject to market pressures – while retaining regulatory 
oversight. The other conflict – as customer of the regulated service – proved too big a problem 
to solve.  
The other charity, we’ll refer to it as ArtsSW, has a different background. It arose for the 
sake of operating a large, diversified performance venue, replacing local government 
bureaucrats with professional arts managers. Its charitable status allowed the venue to 
undertake risky ventures, such as, a) letting new or less-well known producers of art put on 
shows likely to draw only narrow audiences; or b) conducting work with schools and other 
charities to bring arts-focused projects to people with various life problems. To cover the gap, 
ArtsSW also showed big name movies, popular theatre, and hosted conventions and trade 
shows. Between the two were popular arts: a symphony orchestra, touring theatre companies, 
and movies that while not blockbusters still drew crowds to the art-house side of cinema. 
CareSW needed its directors to provide the commercial experience, legal and compliance 
advice, and financial acumen to supplement the skills the largely care-focused management 
team. The management team drew extensively on the directors, with joint board/management 
working groups on major project and tight liaison between the CEO and chair. Most of the 
directors also had personal ties to the care the charity offered.  
ArtsSW needed commercial ideas, too, though more as a sounding board and the sort of 
boundary-spanning discussed in the literatures of entrepreneurship (Zott & Amit, 2007), top-
management (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997) and both corporate (McNulty & Stewart, 2015) 
and public governance (van Meerkerk & Edelenbos, 2018). It could help to have a director 
was also well-connected to local government, prominent in local education circles, or had ties 
to the national arts scene, to open doors, as resource dependency theory suggests (Hillman, 
Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000). ArtsSW needed help with control as well. Few charities are so 
well endowed that they can forgo financial monitoring from the board. But that monitoring is 
also a “service” function – for example, financial ideas as well as warnings – which suggests 
the distinction theoreticians draw between “service” and “control” is less pronounced in the 
lived experience of boards.  
At CareSW, directors were deeply engaged with – though not quite involved in – the 
business. The joint board-management working parties provided opportunities for directors to 
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interact with mid- and lower managers, as well as the senior management, with learning 
spreading in both directions. Individual directors frequently visited the properties that CareSW 
managed, speaking not only to home managers but also to service users and frontline staff. 
That many of the directors had personal engagement with the care offered, through relatives 
or friends or in prior work, heightened the engagement with the CareSW’s activities. 
Emotional bonds strengthened, alongside the intellectual input to strategy, control and 
compliance.  
At ArtsSW, directors were less engaged, attending more events than they might have as 
members of the public, and acting as flag-wavers when dignitaries from local government or 
national arts funders were around. They were encouraged to let friends know of special events, 
in the hope that their enjoyment might lead to donations or end-of-life legacies. Some 
delivered “service” similarly to what happened at CareSW, working with mid- and lower level 
staff on projects designed to raise ArtsSW profile in the local community or with the wider 
arts world. Directors served the company more as ambassadors, perhaps, than as controllers 
(Fama, 1980). 
What I saw in both these organisations were individuals who came to serve on the boards 
out of psychological attachment – more affective than cognitive – to the work of the charity. 
Where listed companies win investors as shareholder/members through their attractiveness as 
producers of dividends and capital gains, charities appeal for donor-funds and would-be 
directors because what they do offers something that society needs and markets cannot deliver. 
Listed companies attract outside directors for the status it confers and the chance to be involved 
with a financial success. These charities attract directors for similar reasons, and perhaps even 
for vainglorious ones. And it’s easier to get appointed as a paid director of a listed company 
board if you’ve already served on an unpaid major charity board. In short, charities directors 
are not entirely without self-centred motivation.  
In short, then, listed companies – and private companies as well – have non-executive 
directors who have incentives to act in self-interested ways. They thus share the agency 
problem that managers exhibit, though in a different direction, one that might act as a brake 
on corporate malfeasance. At charities, by contrast, the lack of remuneration, the chance of 
reputational risk, and the prior emotional as well as intellectual engagement with the work of 
the organisation introduces an antecedent to stewardship in charity board directorship and 
membership.  
The motivation is not quite so straightforward. Charity boards confer upon directors other, 
non-pecuniary benefit. You meet the great-and-good; you gain experience as a director that 
can open the door to paid, corporate directorships. Still, the risk of presenting an agency 
problem is diminished, even if their motivation is not entirely other-directed and aimed at 
collective benefit, as the literature on stewardship might suggest. 
Stewardship and accountability 
These observations lead me to think that there is something similar between the 
stewardship exhibited by employees and even senior managers (Davis et al., 1997) and the 
way directors of charities approach their (largely unpaid) work. Hernandez (2012) suggests 
that the collectivist approach and self-sacrifice in stewardship within corporations arise 
Donald Nordberg 10 Who’s in charge? BAM2019 
through structural factors in control and reward systems that together engender cognitive 
mechanisms that are other-regarding and oriented to the long-term. If rewards are based on 
self-efficacy and self-determination, and if control system promote collaboration and 
collective responsibility, then they also contribute to building affective commitment. Enacting 
these cognitive and affective mechanisms builds psychological ownership, which leads to 
stewardship behaviour. 
Psychological ownership has been seen empirically in studies of employee actions in 
situations in which the workforce has had rewards based on equity stakes – share options or 
other equity-based pay (Holmes, 1967; Pierce & Rodgers, 2004; Pierce, Rubenfeld, & Morgan, 
1991). These conditions induce commitment to organisational goals, leading to greater 
immediate efficiency and effectiveness through self-development in the direction of the 
organisation. This is especially true when psychological ownership is combined with legal 
ownership, or at least the claim of future legal rights that options represent.  
Since the financial crisis, policy in the corporate sector has been striving to replicate such 
commitment among institutional investors, as seen in the UK Stewardship Code (FRC, 2010), 
a measure copied in many other countries (for discussion of an example, see Chiu, 2016). But 
scholars and practitioners have doubts about whether market actors could ever operate in that 
way (Reisberg, 2015). In their analysis of the possibility of investor stewardship, McNulty and 
Nordberg (2016) suggested psychological ownership would be needed to create the conditions 
for the long-term orientation and collaboration of investor and companies the code envisaged. 
But their model of engagement also demonstrated the array of impediments that might prevent 
it, not least developing affective commitment arising after legal ownership, when the investors 
already hold the rights, and when ongoing engagement involves considerable costs.  
The situation is charities is, however, fundamentally different. As discussed above, the 
“members” of a charity – that is, the holders of the legal ownership – seem very often to have 
affective and cognitive commitment to the cause of the charity before they join as member-
directors. Getting over that hurdle is easy. In social-health care charities, many of the directors 
have psychological ownership created by experience within their families of the problems that 
the charities they serve seek to address. In arts charities, many have affection for the outputs 
of the artists, have artists in the family, or have worked in the arts. In both charity archetypes, 
psychological ownership of member-directors seems to pre-date legal ownership, and a 
“service” orientation, with its forward-looking focus on innovation, is embedded on 
appointment (see Figure 1). Unlike investors in capital markets, and more like investors in 
family-controlled firms (Cannella, Jones, & Withers, 2015), member-directors identify with 
the company, reinforcing psychological ownership. Moreover, in charities, both psychological 
and legal ownership are separated from any financial arrangements. Charity member-directors 
are, so to speak, interested in the business but have no interest in it.  
When directors of a charity are also its members, then they are accountable, directly, only 
to themselves. That is not to say they are unaccountable. Regulators play an important, as do 
donors and funders for the sake of continuing operation, and the same applies to a large extent 
in other organisational forms. But in the governance layer of “owners”, these member-
directors are accountable only to themselves. They fire each other, if they choose to, as I did, 
in effect, by telling non-director members I wanted them to stand down.  
remain that way unless stewardship takes a stronger hold on our scholarship. 
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1
 “To attempt” in French is “essayer”; an essay is an attempt to answer a question, not the answer. A 
French synonym is “une tentative”. 
2
 This paper uses the terms “trustee” and “director” essentially as the same thing with respect to 
charity boards. The title “director” in UK company law applies to someone who sits on the board of 
any type of company. The term “trustee” in English law refers to someone given control over assets 
in trust for one or more beneficiaries or for charitable purposes.  
3
 For a detailed discussion of “reasonableness” in corporate governance theory, see Nordberg (2018). 
4
 For details, see Section 11 of the trusteee guidance document of the Charity Commission at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/73
4288/CC3_may18.pdf 
5
 The examples were are formed English (and Welsh) law; the legal position in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland is similar in many regards. 
                                               
  
 
Figure 1 - 'Member' stewardship through ownership 
But that assumes that accountability is always hierarchical. Roberts (1991, 2001) argues 
that in practice we find horizontal as well as vertical accountability. The vertical variety is 
associated with power over rewards and punishment; it “individualises”, and it can operate at 
a distance. The horizontal variety is associated with repeated interaction over long period of 
time; it “socialises”, and it operates only in quite intimate circumstances.  
Similarly, and in the setting of health care, the philosopher Baroness O'Neill (2002a, 
2002b) argued that the accountability against targets was often counter-productive. Instead she 
advocated the importance of “intelligent accountability”, the interpersonal variety, dependent 
on relationships and openness.   
Discussion and research agenda on charity boards 
Charity boards may be accountable only to themselves, but directors are accountable to 
each other. As members, they elect new directors and can dismiss others. As directors, they 
face dismissal or being outvoted or ignored through the “intelligent accountability” of the 
judgement of peers. If this is the case, then it does not prevent groupthink (Janis, 1972; 
Maharaj, 2008; Whyte, 1952/2012) from arising through excessive deference (including to a 
new chair who doesn’t yet understand the business!). Let’s consider then what research might 
teach us about what happens, and ought to happen. 
An empirical agenda – who is in charge? 
Who is in charge, empirically, in charities? First, let’s think about board-management 
relations. While boards are constitutionally separate from management, that doesn’t imply 
they are in a strong position to monitor management or contribute to resource provision. So, 
do charity boards work in the way, with the same benefits to “control” and downsides to 
information flow, that supervisory boards do in the two-tier boards in continental Europe? 
Information flows are still controlled by the executives, and a confrontational stance by the 
board might be punished by executives withholding important information and ignoring board 
directives. Given their lack of financial interest in the outcomes, to what extent and in what 
ways do charity boards exercise their structural power over management? Do charity boards 
meet in camera, without the executives present, and if so, what issues do they consider?  
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Who is charge within the boardroom? Studies of corporate boards suffer from the “black 
box” phenomenon owing to a lack of access, but the accounts we have suggest there is a 
mixture of collaboration and bullying, mutual respect and intimidation, coalitions and cliques. 
In corporate boards, Leblanc and Gillies (2005) found that persuasiveness was central to 
director effectiveness. In a very rare case of observation research using video recording, 
Bezemer, Nicholson, and Pugliese (2018) found the chair’s approach was decisive, though 
with a somewhat surprising twist: active involvement of the chair in debates tended to hinder 
engagement of other directors, research that hints at a need for chairs to engage in non-
traditional modes of leadership, of the shared (Bolden, 2011) or servant (van Dierendonck, 
2011) varieties.  
Are “members” ever in charge? Notionally, members in UK law hold legal ownership, but 
in the case of charities without financial interest and without right to use the company’s 
resources. As regulators can withdraw charitable status and thus impede any actions of 
members, what significance does membership have? Moreover, how does their lack of 
financial interest of members or member-directors affect their cognitive engagement? 
Assuming I’m right that psychological ownership of charities pre-dates the legal, how does 
affective commitment to the cause influence development of cognitive engagement with the 
business? How might affective commitment impair development of the critical edge needed 
to conduct monitoring? And under what conditions are charity directors either committed to 
the work, engaged in ways short of commitment, or just performing the basics?  
A normative agenda – in whose interest?  
There are many other issues that arise about the functioning of charity boards and how 
they might be more effective. Let me articulate one before moving on to the most important 
issue of all – in whose interest? 
Effective boards would seem to require having a strong view of what constitutes 
effectiveness and how a board would know whether it was. The first of those issues has been 
an important topic in the normative corporate governance literature. A particularly noteworthy 
example is focus on inputs and processes by Forbes and Milliken (1999), while other scholars 
have examined the role of structures (Zahra & Pearce, 1989) and directors’ psychological and 
interpersonal qualities (Samra-Fredericks, 2000). Cornforth (2001) attempted to translate such 
concerns into the charitable sector, creating a list of characteristics of effective boards. More 
recently, the policy agenda in corporate governance has emphasised the importance of board 
evaluation as a tool of assessing effectiveness (Nordberg & Booth, 2018). But evaluation is a 
time-consuming exercise, and volunteer directors of charitable companies may think they’re 
done enough. Moreover, evaluation may not be particularly costly for a large, listed company. 
For charitable ones, they could tip the balance into deficit. What can – what should – charities 
do to ensure their boards work better? If this policy direction is seen as an imperative, what 
other mechanisms can the sector or the state find to make the process easier to conduct?  
And in whose interest do we do this? The simple answer is the one that figures only in 
corners of this paper, so far, and in the literature only generally: the beneficiaries. It is for their 
benefit that the charity exists. The purpose of regulators is to set the rules and ensure that 
actors play by them. In commercial settings, that means they operate to ensure the counterparty 
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in a market transaction can count on the other side fulfilling its obligations, and to mitigate the 
effects of power imbalances that might make the market less efficient.  
As we’ve discussed, charities operate where markets don’t work particularly well. Here 
the regulators pick up some of the slack in governance, concerning deficiencies in markets in 
goods and services. But do their actions on behalf of beneficiaries also make up for the deficit 
in governance that arises when the distinction between boards and owners collapses? Are 
regulators – at considerable distance from the service delivery – well enough equipped to 
represent the beneficiaries’ interest? In “arts”, the risk is that the underprivileged will miss out 
on the benefits of the experience of art, and that artists may lose the ability to develop their 
talent. In “care”, the main problems seem to arise in the lack of attention – the lack of care – 
in the day-to-day actions, where regulators seem ill-equipped to intervene promptly, allowing 
the sort of scandals noted at the start of this paper to arise.  
So, how do charity boards ensure the voice of the beneficiary is heard and understood? 
Given the inherent power imbalances, the confidentiality due to beneficiaries, and the reasons 
why their concerns cannot be addressed by markets, it is important that board do something? 
Exploratory research into what happens now, what works and doesn’t, might well help us to 
work out what ought to be done.  
Conclusions 
Charities perform important services for society, services that markets alone probably 
would not provide, and services that, increasingly since the 1980s, the state has declined to 
provide, at least directly. The New Public Management approach may be ideological, but there 
is something in the argument that the state is too distant to deal such cases, and that a more 
granular, personalised and accountable approach is needed. 
This paper has attempted, through a personal account, to articulate some of the gaps in the 
understanding. I don’t pretend this represents either a rigorous attempt at something small or 
a broadly valid analysis of the sector and its issues. What I think is true is this: that charities 
are different, that they require more of the attention to governance that the corporate sector 
has received, and that they are unlikely to get it for the same reasons of market failure that 
affect their service delivery. Charities draw on hand-me-downs in governance thinking, the 
way that charity shops deal in hand-me-down clothes and personal belongings. It’s likely to  
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